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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Consumer Financial 
Protection Act into law1 as a part of the Dodd-Frank Act.2 This Act 
created the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (hereinafter 
“CFPB”), which is an “independent bureau” that is “in the Federal 
Reserve System,” but is to “be considered an Executive agency.”3
While the CFPB is a part of the Federal Reserve System, it is subject 
to very little oversight from the Federal Reserve. The CFPB does not 
report to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the Board 
has no power to override decisions of the CFPB,4 and the Board does 
not have appropriations authority over the CFPB.5
 The Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law in the wake of the finan-
cial crisis, and the CFPB was meant to “protect consumers from un-
fair, deceptive, and abusive acts that so often trap them in unafford-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
? J.D. 2013, summa cum laude, Florida State University College of Law. 
 1. Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate.html?_r=0. 
 2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C. (2012)). 
 3. Id. § 1011(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012)). 
 4. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing how the only body with 
the power to override CFPB policy initiatives is the Financial Stability Oversight Council, 
which can only defeat CFPB regulations with a supermajority vote of its members).  
 5. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (discussing how the Federal Reserve 
is bound by statute to provide a specified percentage of its budget to the CFPB, at the dis-
cretion of the CFPB Director). 
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able financial products.”6 According to the Senate report, “it was the 
failure by the prudential regulators to give sufficient consideration to 
consumer protection that helped bring the financial system down.”7
The report goes on to assert that “it was the organizations that pro-
mote consumer protection that were urging that underwriting stand-
ards be tightened for both consumer protection and safety and 
soundness reasons, and it was the prudential regulators who ignored  
these calls.”8
 To be sure, the prudential regulators’ focus on encouraging home 
ownership—a goal which it pursued with blind zealousness while 
utterly failing to give sufficient consideration to consumer protec-
tion—contributed to the financial crisis. Predatory lending, and other 
abusive practices that could have been curtailed had sufficient con-
sumer protection been in place, certainly enhanced the magnitude of 
the crisis,9 but so did consumers that decided to strategically default 
on their mortgages.10 Ultimately, as discussed in Part III.A, inade-
quate consumer protection was just one of many causes of the finan-
cial crisis, and it is unlikely that increased consumer protection alone 
would have significantly reduced the scale of the financial crisis. 
 That said, it is clear that prior to the creation of the CFPB con-
sumers were not adequately protected, and the system designed to 
protect them was in need of substantial reform. Thus, at first glance, 
it appears that the creation of the CFPB is a positive development, 
and that with its creation consumers will finally have adequate pro-
tection. Unfortunately, the CFPB suffers from serious structural de-
ficiencies that, if not reformed, may ultimately result in the CFPB 
harming the consumers it is meant to protect.   
 This Note begins with a discussion of the creation of the CFPB 
and its brief history in Part I.A, and then in Part II it assesses the 
structural deficiencies of the CFPB, comparing it to past regulatory 
agencies that failed. Part III provides an overview of the causes of 
the financial crisis and finds that the CFPB cannot prevent another 
crisis. As explained in Part IV, in order for the CFPB to avoid suffer-
ing from the same type of tunnel vision that made past regulatory 
agencies that were similarly structured fail, the CFPB must be re-
formed. Most importantly, the CFPB should be: (1) made subject to 
congressional oversight,11 (2) reformed to be led by a multimember 
commission instead of a single director,12 (3) made subject to review 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 6. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11 (2010). 
 7. Id. at 166. 
8. Id.
 9. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (discussing the failures of the pru-
dential regulators and abusive practices). 
 10. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (discussing strategic defaults). 
 11. See infra Part IV.A. 
 12. See infra Part IV.B. 
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by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,13 and (4) made 
subject to more meaningful review from the Financial Stability Over-
sight Council by reducing the vote needed to veto a CFPB action from 
two-thirds to one-half.14
A.   The Creation of the CFPB and the Appointment of Its              
First Director 
 The architect of the CFPB, Elizabeth Warren, first proposed creat-
ing a new consumer financial protection agency in a short article 
published in 2007.15 Warren proposed basing this new agency on the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (hereinafter “CPSC”), which 
regulates the safety of consumer products, saying that “[f]inancial 
products should be subject to the same routine safety screening that 
now governs the sale of every toaster, washing machine, and child’s 
car seat sold on the American market.”16 Despite the logical fallacies 
in basing an agency designed to protect consumers in credit markets 
off of one designed to protect them from dangerous appliances,17 the 
Obama Administration published a “White Paper” in 2009 on finan-
cial regulatory reform which embraced Warren’s idea and advocated 
for financial reform legislation including a new consumer financial 
protection agency modeled on the CPSC.18 This paper provided the 
framework for the original version of the financial reform legisla-
tion,19 which was introduced by Representative Barney Frank in July  
of 2009.20
 In the originally introduced version, the new agency was to be led 
by a multimember commission21 and funded by appropriations.22 But 
in the modified version of the bill, which was enacted by the House of 
Representatives in December of 2009, the new agency was designed 
to be free from appropriations oversight, instead receiving ten percent 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 13. See infra Part IV.C. 
 14. See infra Part IV.D. 
 15. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J. 8, 16 (Summer 2007), 
available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6528. 
 16. Id. at 16.  
 17. See Todd J. Zywicki & Stefanie Haeffele-Balch, Loans Are Not Toasters: The Problems 
with a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, MERCATUS ON POL’Y 1-2 (Oct. 2009), available 
at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/MOP_-_60_Loans_are_not_Toasters_web.pdf (pointing 
out that while a dangerous product such as an exploding toaster is not useful to any con-
sumer, virtually all consumer credit products, from payday loans to mortgages, are suitable 
and useful to some consumers in some situations). 
 18. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 55-63 
(2009), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/finregfinal06172009.pdf. 
 19. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 860 (2013). 
 20. H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. § 112 (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
BILLS-111hr3126ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr3126ih.pdf. 
 21. Id.
 22. Id. § 118. 
694 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:691 
of the Federal Reserve System’s total expense budget as guaranteed 
funds each year.23 And by the time the legislation that ultimately be-
came the Dodd-Frank Act was introduced in the Senate by Senator 
Christopher Dodd in April of 2010, the agency had been changed 
from a standalone agency to a bureau of the Federal Reserve, which 
instead of being led by a multimember commission was to have a sin-
gle director.24 Three months later, the Dodd-Frank financial reform 
legislation passed Congress over near uniform Republican opposition 
and was signed into law.25
 The creation of the CFPB was met with considerable criticism be-
fore the Dodd-Frank Act was even passed,26 and it has been sur-
rounded in controversy since its creation, including over the selection 
of its inaugural director.27 Originally, it was expected that the first 
proponent of a new consumer protection agency, Elizabeth Warren, 
would become the CFPB’s first director, but it eventually became 
clear that Warren would not be able to get Senate confirmation.28
Consequently, Warren was never even nominated. President Obama 
ultimately nominated former Ohio Attorney General Richard 
Cordray to serve as the inaugural director of the CFPB.29 Senate Re-
publicans quickly announced their intention to filibuster any vote on 
confirmation of Cordray as director until structural reforms were made 
to the CFPB.30 Most importantly, the Republicans advocated having 
the agency run by a multimember commission, making it subject to 
congressional appropriations authority, and giving the other finan-
cial regulatory agencies more oversight power over the CFPB.31       
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 23. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 4109 (2009) (enacted), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4173ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr4173ih.pdf. 
 24. See Sewell Chan, Dodd to Unveil a Broad Financial Overhaul Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
14, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/business/14bank.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 25. See Cooper, supra note 1.  
 26. See, e.g., Jessica Holzer, Republicans Criticize Agency for Consumers, WALL
ST. J. (July 15, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124758746553939621.html? 
KEYWORDS=consumer+financial+protection+bureau; Richard A. Posner, Op-Ed.,  
Treating Financial Consumers as Consenting Adults, WALL ST. J. (July 22,  
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203946904574302213213148166.html? 
KEYWORDS=consumer+financial+protection+bureau (expressing concern that the agency 
has the power to “design ‘standard’ consumer financial products that will contain whatever 
‘features or terms [are] defined by the Agency for the product or service’ ”).  
 27. Damian Paletta, Fight Over Consumer Agency Looms as Overhaul is Signed, WALLST.J. (July 
22, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704746804575367502836650966. 
html?KEYWORDS=consumer+financial+protection+bureau+elizabeth+warren+director. 
28. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Warren’s Candidacy Raises a Partisan Debate, N.Y.
TIMES (July 25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/business/26warren.html?_r=0; 
Paletta, supra note 27. 
 29. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Former Ohio Attorney General to Head New Consumer 
Agency, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/business/ 
former-ohio-attorney-general-picked-to-lead-consumer-agency.html?pagewanted=all. 
 30. See John H. Cushman Jr., Senate Stops Consumer Nominee, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/business/senate-blocks-obama-choice-for-consumer-panel.html. 
 31. See id.
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 The Obama Administration was unwilling to agree to make any of 
these reforms, and the director position consequently remained emp-
ty until January 4, 2012, when President Obama named Cordray as 
CFPB Director, stating that he had the authority to do so under his 
power to make recess appointments, despite the fact that the Senate 
had gone less than three days without meeting.32 This was the first 
recess appointment made during a break of fewer than ten days since 
a 1993 opinion of the Justice Department which suggested that 
breaks of just a few days would not be sufficient.33 House Speaker 
John Boehner referred to the action as “an extraordinary and entirely 
unprecedented power grab by President Obama that defies centuries 
of practice and the legal advice of his own Justice Department.”34
Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell stated that “[t]his recess 
appointment represents a sharp departure from a long-standing 
precedent that has limited the president to recess appointments only 
when the Senate is in a recess of 10 days or longer.”35 Senator 
McConnell expressed concern that “[b]reaking from this precedent 
lands this appointee in uncertain legal territory, threatens the con-
firmation process and fundamentally endangers the Congress’ role in 
providing a check on the excesses of the executive branch.”36
 Even if the appointment is constitutionally valid, it may have 
been statutorily deficient, as the CFPB statute specifies that “the Di-
rector shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.”37 Thus, Cordray’s status as Director re-
mains unclear, but the CFPB has nonetheless begun exercising its 
authority, announcing its first enforcement action on July 18, 2012.38
The constitutionality of Cordray’s appointment has no bearing on the 
problems with the structure of the CFPB, but the issue does bring 
into sharp focus how unusual the structure of the CFPB is.  
 The Senators who blocked Cordray’s Senate appointment did not 
do so because they did not think he was fit for the job—in fact, many 
of them praised Cordray’s qualifications for the job.39 But they 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 32. See Jim Puzzanghera & Lisa Mascaro, Obama Bypassing Senate to Appoint Rich-
ard Cordray Consumer Chief, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2012/jan/04/business/la-fi-obama-cordray-20120104. 
 33. See id.
 34. Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consum-
er Chief, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/politics/ 
richard-cordray-named-consumer-chief-in-recess-appointment.html?pagewanted=all. 
35. Puzzanghera & Mascaro, supra note 32. 
 36. See id.
 37. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(2) (2012). 
 38. See Halah Touryalai, Obama’s Consumer Protection Agency Strikes: $210M Fine 
for Capital One, FORBES (July 18, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/ 
07/18/obamas-consumer-protection-agency-strikes-210m-fine-for-capital-one/. 
 39. See Ylan Q. Mui, Senate Blocks Richard Cordray Confirmation to Head Consumer 
Watchdog Agency, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
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pledged to prevent any candidate from being confirmed unless the 
CFPB was reformed, including changing its leadership from having a 
single director to a multimember commission.40 The CFPB is unique 
in that, unlike other regulatory agencies, it is headed by a single di-
rector who is only removable for cause;41 this anomaly and other 
structural deficiencies of the CFPB were daunting enough to con-
vince forty-five percent of the Senate to block the appointment of a 
highly qualified candidate and to refuse to appoint any candidate un-
til the deficiencies could be addressed,42 prompting the President to 
make the disputed recess appointment of Cordray.43     
II. REPEATING THE MISTAKES OF THE PAST: THE STRUCTURAL 
DEFECTS OF THE CFPB 
 A.   Why Past Independent Regulatory Agencies Failed 
 In the history of the United States, numerous regulatory agencies 
have been put into place, many of which were structurally designed 
to be independent so that they could be insulated from market and 
political pressures and freely pursue the “public interest.”44 The theo-
ry behind such agencies seems to be that insulating regulatory agen-
cies from congressional oversight is the best way to ensure that poli-
cies are made absent any outside pressure and instead are made 
based on what is best for the public.45 In the abstract, this view seems 
to make logical sense, but as became clear in the decades following 
the creation of agencies structured to be highly independent, having 
a government agency insulated from other government sectors can 
lead to disastrous regulatory policies.46 While such insulation pro-
vides independence, it also results in isolation.  
 Insulation from outside pressures can be a good thing, but isola-
tion from other agencies and the rest of the government is not, as it 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2chambers/post/senate-republicans-block-cordray-as-obama-consumer-watchdog-nominee/2011/ 
12/08/gIQA6j9BfO_blog.html. 
 40. See id.
 41. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing how other federal regula-
tory agencies are headed by multimember commissions or boards). 
 42. See Mui, supra note 39. 
 43. See Puzzanghera & Mascaro, supra note 32. 
 44. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLI-
CATIONS IN LAW 44-46 (2009) (discussing the role of the “public interest” theory of regulation). 
 45. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institu-
tional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 42-44 (2010) (expressing concern that any agency subject 
to congressional appropriations authority will have its decisions improperly influenced by  
partisan considerations).  
 46. See infra notes 60-72 and accompanying text (discussing how the Civil Aero-
nautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission created policies conflicting with 
other sectors and having results counterproductive to their purposes, leading ultimately to 
both agencies being abolished). 
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can lead to a conflicting and irrational regulatory scheme.47 An iso-
lated agency trying to achieve a desired result in one sector might 
unwittingly cause a disproportionally negative effect in another sec-
tor.48 It was these types of concerns that led to the creation of the Of-
fice of Information and Regulatory Affairs (hereinafter “OIRA”), 
which was designed to create coherence among the often-conflicting 
directives of the various regulatory agencies and to try to balance the 
efforts of each agency so as to preserve broader interests—such as 
economic growth and national security.49 When the OIRA discovers a 
position that is inconsistent with the overarching regulatory scheme, 
it can coordinate with the agency taking the outlier position to en-
sure that the overall regulatory scheme remains consistent and co-
herent.50 Thus, the OIRA largely solved the problem of conflicting di-
rectives and helped to make the regulatory process more collaborative, 
in the process somewhat reducing the independence of the agencies 
subject to its jurisdiction. 
 The problems prompting the creation of the OIRA demonstrate 
why having agencies be completely independent is not ideal, but the 
OIRA cannot completely solve these problems, in part because inde-
pendent regulatory agencies, including the CFPB, are exempt from 
OIRA oversight.51 It is also important to note that while an agency 
can be free from direct political oversight, no amount of statutory in-
dependence can prevent the bureaucrats running the agency from 
pursuing their own ideological and political objectives.52 Nor can it 
prevent special interest groups from exerting influence over the bu-
reaucrats, some of whom will inevitably leave the agency to pursue 
careers in private practice in the fields that they were previously 
regulating.53 Of course, this is not a problem limited to bureaucrats.  
 As subscribers to the public choice theory have long recognized, all 
actors in political life—including voters, legislators, bureaucrats, and 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 47. See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 44, at 363 (noting that a “potential problem 
for bureaucratic actors is a tendency toward ‘tunnel vision,’ meaning too narrow a focus on 
their particular regulatory agenda at the expense of alternative policy goals”). 
 48. See id. (“[B]ureaucratic tunnel vision might create or exacerbate risks in one sec-
tor while seeking to eliminate or to reduce it in another.”). 
 49. See id. at 366-67 (discussing the formation of the OIRA and its purpose); Barkow, 
supra note 45, at 30-31. 
 50. See Barkow, supra note 45, at 30-31. 
 51. See infra Part IV.C (arguing that the CFPB and other independent regulatory 
agencies should be subject to OIRA review). 
 52. See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 44, at 364-65. 
53. See, e.g., Dan Gallagher, Deputy Director of Trading and Markets, to Leave SEC 
and Return to Private Practice, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 25, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-11.htm (announcing that SEC Deputy 
Director Gallagher was leaving the SEC to return to private practice); FTC Bureau of 
Competition Deputy Director Barry Nigro Returns to Private Practice, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/11/nigro.shtm (announcing that 
FTC Deputy Director Nigro was leaving the FTC to return to private practice). 
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even judges—“behave rationally to maximize or optimize some objec-
tive function (wealth, status, power).”54 In regards to elected officials, 
the voters can, in theory, remove from office those that are acting 
contrary to the beliefs and views of the voters, thus providing an in-
centive for those officials to act at least to some degree with the in-
terests of their constituents in mind.55 This is one of the hallmarks of 
a representative democracy.56 The same logic applies to unelected bu-
reaucrats—when subject to congressional or executive oversight they 
would, in theory, act with some regard to input and concerns from 
the overseers, if only out of self-interest in maintaining their posi-
tions. That said, whether the possibility of removal actually results in 
the preferences of the person holding the power to remove signifi-
cantly influencing the official’s actions is questionable.57 But the risk 
of self-interested behavior is especially great in the case of an agency 
that is structurally highly independent. As recognized by the public 
choice theory, an agency could never truly be independent because 
of the biases and preferences of the bureaucrats running it, and 
without any type of oversight there is little to stop such an agency 
from acting in accordance with those biases and preferences—favoring 
particular sets of ideological and political beliefs without giving  
due consideration to other views. This type of structure and the po-
tential for decisions to be made in pursuit of a particular set of ideo-
logical beliefs without any substantive input from anyone with a dif-
ferent view58 makes the agency much more likely to suffer the type of 
narrow-minded “tunnel vision” that results in conflicting policies and  
unintended consequences.59
 Prior to the creation of the OIRA, there existed a number of agen-
cies structured to be highly independent. The Interstate Commerce 
Commission (hereinafter “ICC”) and the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(hereinafter “CAB”) are classic examples of “independent” agencies 
gone wrong.60 Both of those agencies were, like the CFPB, designed to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 54. Jerry Louis Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 19, 20 (Daniel A. Farber & Ann  
Joseph eds., 2010). 
 55. See id. at 21 (discussing how in an “idealist account” the problem of representa-
tives acting contrary to the desires of a majority of the voters is cured by the dynamics of 
the system because “[o]ver time the voters can replace legislators whose preferences do not 
reflect those of their constituents”).  
 56. See Richard Bellamy, The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of 
Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy, 44 POL. STUD. 436, 445 (1996), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531367.  
 57. See Mashaw, supra note 54, at 21 (“The notion that voters’ preferences control 
legislative action or that legislative action controls bureaucratic decision making is, [under 
the public choice theory,] a fundamental misdescription of U.S. government.”). 
 58. See infra Part IV.B (discussing how no meaningful restraints exist on the CFPB’s 
ability to make decisions without input from outsiders with different views and interests).  
 59. See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 44, at 363. 
 60. See id. at 326. 
2013]           CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 699 
be highly independent, and both of those agencies were ultimately 
abolished in a bipartisan effort to restructure or abolish government 
agencies which had, as a consequence of their extreme independence, 
created policies conflicting with other sectors and had created results 
counterproductive to their purpose.61
 The ICC was created in 1887, making it the nation’s very first in-
dependent regulatory agency.62 The agency was originally put into 
place to regulate interstate rates charged by railroads, but its power 
was gradually increased by Congress to include numerous other as-
pects of interstate rail travel, including safety and racial discrimina-
tion.63 Then, in the late 1970s through early 1980s, the Executive 
Branch began using its appointment power to fill the Board of Com-
missioners that ran the ICC with individuals “fervently dedicated to 
deregulation.”64 The ICC pursued deregulation with such narrow-
mindedness and zeal that “courts . . . found it necessary to remind 
the ICC that Congress’ decision to enter into comprehensive regula-
tion contravenes the ICC’s apparent belief that national policy un-
qualifiedly favors competition.”65 The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit accused the ICC of “disregarding congressional 
intent by making decisions solely for the purpose of increasing com-
petition.”66 Congress ultimately abolished the ICC in 1995.67
 In 1938, Congress created the Civil Aeronautics Authority, which 
it then reorganized the subsequent year as the CAB, to regulate the 
airline industry, much as the ICC regulated the railroads.68 The CAB 
was based off of the ICC; in fact, President Roosevelt had initially 
wanted to give the ICC the power to regulate the airlines rather than 
create a new agency, but that was avoided out of a concern that the 
ICC would protect railroad interests over aviation interests.69 Like 
the ICC, the CAB began to suffer from narrow-minded tunnel vision 
in the 1970s, focusing on deregulation as the answer to all the airline 
industry’s problems.70 Congress ultimately abolished the CAB in leg-
islation passed in 1978, though the CAB continued operating until it 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 61. See id. (discussing the abolishment of the CAB and the ICC).  
 62. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 235, 
265 (2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1793331. 
 63. See id. at 265, 267-69, 315-16. 
 64. See id. at 347. 
 65. See id. at 349. 
 66. See id. (citing Argo-Collier Truck Lines v. United States, 611 F.2d 149, 155 (6th  
Cir. 1979)). 
 67. See id. at 350. 
 68. See id. at 289-90. 
 69. See id. at 290. 
 70. See id. at 333-36. 
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winded down in 1984.71 The legislation passed with “overwhelming  
bipartisan support.”72
Other agencies suffering from similar independence-related prob-
lems, such as the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter “FTC”), 
were dramatically reformed to significantly increase congressional 
oversight.73 Originally created in 1914, the FTC is charged with pro-
tecting consumers from fraud in the marketplace and “preventing 
anticompetitive business practices.”74 As it exists today, the FTC is 
run by “five Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed commission-
ers,” who each serve in seven-year terms.75 At any given time, a max-
imum of three of the five commissioners may be members of the Pres-
ident’s political party.76 This type of structure, with a multimember 
commission as opposed to a single director, reduces the risk of nar-
row-minded behavior and inconsistent policies, but perhaps not 
enough. Even adding congressional budgetary authority may not be 
enough; one of the most independent modern regulatory agencies is 
the Federal Reserve itself, which—while run by a multimember 
commission and subject to congressional budgetary authority, unlike 
the CFPB—has been guilty of focusing too narrowly on a particular 
goal, not taking into account the effect on the other government sec-
tors and on the economy as a whole.77 This highlights why, as dis-
cussed in Part IV, the CFPB should not only be subject to congres-
sional budgetary authority and run by a multimember commission, but 
should also be made subject to review by the OIRA and subject to more 
meaningful review from the Financial Stability Oversight Council.   
B.   The Structure of the CFPB Ignores These Lessons From History  
 The CFPB is structured in a way that completely ignores the les-
sons learned from the failures of past agencies. First, the CFPB is 
completely exempt from the congressional appropriations process, 
instead receiving guaranteed funds from the Federal Reserve, equal 
to “the amount determined by the [CFPB] Director to be reasonably 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
71. Id. at 336. 
 72. Id.
 73. See Zywicki, supra note 19, at 871-72. 
 74. Spencer Weber Waller, Jillian G. Brady & R.J. Acosta, Consumer Protection in the 
United States: An Overview, EUR. J. CONSUMER L. 803, 805-07 (2011) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1000226.   
 75. Id.
 76. Id.
 77. See Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 503, 548-50 (2000). Shortly after President Reagan’s election, Congress enacted and 
the President approved $540 billion in tax cuts as a part of a fiscal stimulus meant to pro-
mote economic growth. Id. The Federal Reserve responded by allowing short-term interest 
rates to skyrocket up to 20.5% in pursuit of its desire to have tighter monetary policies; the 
Federal Reserve’s actions conflicted with the efforts of Congress and contributed to a sharp 
increase in unemployment, along with a sharp decrease in the gross national product. Id.
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necessary to carry out the authorities of the [CFPB] . . . .”78 Thus, the 
CFPB Director has sole discretion in determining how large the 
agency’s budget will be, subject to statutory limits. In 2011 the limit 
was ten percent of the Federal Reserve’s total operating expenses, 
with the limit increasing to eleven percent in 2012, and twelve per-
cent in 2013, with the twelve percent rate applying to each year 
thereafter.79 This resulted in the CFPB receiving $162 million in 
mandatory appropriations in 201180 and $344 million in 2012,81 with 
a total of $522 million appropriated for the 2013 fiscal year.82 Thus, 
during the 2013 fiscal year, the CFPB will be receiving more than 
half a billion dollars in mandatory appropriations with no budgetary 
oversight from Congress, the Federal Reserve, or anyone else outside 
of the CFPB. While this may be a reasonable cost to run an agency of 
the CFPB’s size and magnitude, the concern is not just the amount of 
money but the fact that by having its appropriations guaranteed the 
CFPB is exempt from congressional appropriations authority, which 
leaves Congress without any meaningful way to oversee the actions 
of the CFPB.83
 Second, the CFPB is led by a single director who is appointed for a 
fixed term of five years and can only be removed for “cause,” meaning 
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”84 This differ-
entiates the CFPB from most other federal regulatory agencies, 
which are led by multimember commissions or boards, including the 
CPSC,85 which was “the inspiration for the [CFPB’s] creation”;86 the 
FTC;87 the Commodities Futures Exchange Commission;88 the Federal 
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 78. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(1) (2012). 
 79. Id. § 5497(a)(2)(A). 
 80. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013: OTHER INDE-
PENDENT AGENCIES 1295, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/ 
budget/fy2013/assets/oia.pdf. 
 81. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014: OTHER INDE-
PENDENT AGENCIES 1205-06, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/budget/fy2014/assets/oia.pdf. 
 82. Id.
 83. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that the CFPB should be subject to some degree of  
congressional oversight). 
 84. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(1)-(3) (2012). 
 85. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission Organizational Chart, U.S. CONSUMER 
PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/PageFiles/128975/orgchart.pdf (last visited May 
10, 2013) (showing that the Commission is headed by a group of five Commissioners). 
 86. Barkow, supra note 45, at 72.  
 87. Commissioners, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/commissioners/index. 
shtml (last modified Mar. 21, 2013) (“The Commission is headed by five Commissioners, nom-
inated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, each serving a seven-year term.”). 
 88. Commissioners, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/ 
About/Commissioners/index.htm (last visited May 10, 2013) (“The Commission consists of 
five commissioners appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
to serve staggered five-year terms. . . . No more than three commissioners at any one time 
may be from the same political party.”). 
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Deposit Insurance Corporation;89 the Federal Reserve;90 and the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter “SEC”).91 To be sure, 
many agencies are headed by a single director, but unlike the director 
of the CFPB these directors are almost always removable at the pleas-
ure of the President or another specified official, and they generally do 
not hold any significant policymaking responsibilities.92 An example is 
the Food and Drug Administration, which is led by a single commis-
sioner who serves at the pleasure of the Secretary of the Department 
of Health and does not wield any significant policymaking authority.93
 Third, the CFPB is not subject to OIRA review,94 and thus the 
safeguard against the historical problem of independent agencies 
creating policies conflicting with other government sectors or not co-
herently fitting into the overall regulatory scheme does not apply to 
the CFPB. The only body that can override decisions of the CFPB is 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (hereinafter “FSOC”), which 
was created as a part of Dodd-Frank95 to be a “collaborative body 
chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury that brings together the ex-
pertise of the federal financial regulators, an independent insurance 
expert appointed by the President, and state regulators” for the pur-
pose of “identifying risks and responding to emerging threats to  
financial stability.”96 The FSOC has ten voting members, made up  
of the heads of the nine federal financial regulatory agencies and  
one independent member appointed by the President, who must have 
insurance expertise.97 The FSOC can only override CFPB decisions by 
a two-thirds vote, and each member of the FSOC can only vote to set 
aside a regulation of the CFPB if the agency or department that the 
member represents has “made an official determination, at a public 
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 89. Board of Directors & Senior Executives, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/board/index.html (last updated Mar. 5, 2013) (showing that 
the Corporation is run by a Board of five Directors). 
 90. About the Fed, FED. RESERVE, http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed 
/default.htm (last updated Apr. 24, 2013) (showing that the Federal Reserve is headed by a  
seven-member Board). 
 91. Current SEC Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner.shtml (last modified Apr. 11, 2013) (“The Securities 
and Exchange Commission has five Commissioners who are appointed by the President of 
the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate. Their terms last five years 
and are staggered . . . . To ensure that the Commission remains non-partisan, no more 
than three Commissioners may belong to the same political party.”). 
 92. See Zywicki, supra note 19, at 873-74. 
 93. See JAMES T. O’REILLY, 1 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. § 2:2 (2012). 
 94. Hester Peirce, Economic Analysis by Federal Financial Regulators 5-6  
(Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 12-31, 2012), available at
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/FinancialRegulators_Peirce_v1-0.pdf. 
 95. See 12 U.S.C. § 5513 (2012). 
 96. Financial Stability Oversight Council: About FSOC, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx (last updated  
May 10, 2013). 
 97. 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1) (2012). 
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meeting where applicable, that the regulation which is the subject of 
the petition would put the safety and soundness of the United States 
banking system or the stability of the financial system of the United 
States at risk.”98
 The FSOC thus has very limited oversight authority over the 
CFPB; a regulation passed by the CFPB will still become effective 
even if a majority of the FSOC’s members—who are some of the most 
knowledgeable people in the world when it comes to designing effec-
tive regulations—vote against it after the department or agency they 
represent has made an official determination that the regulation 
would “put the safety and soundness of the United States banking 
system or the stability of the financial system of the United States at 
risk.”99 This is a virtually insurmountable standard, and an unreason-
able one, considering that any one of these regulatory experts making 
such a determination should be enough to at least warrant a second 
look at the regulation so the dissenter’s concerns can be considered.   
 Taken collectively, the above provisions may well make the CFPB 
the most independent agency in United States history,100 and it is dif-
ficult to imagine an agency design more likely to result in the agency 
acting with the type of tunnel vision focus on its regulatory mission 
that led to conflicting and incoherent regulatory policies prior to the 
reforms of the 1970s-80s.101 For example, in an effort to protect con-
sumers the CFPB might overly restrict access to mortgages and other 
financial products, resulting in otherwise qualified consumers, who 
would benefit from the financial products, being denied access. In 
addition to being a bad policy that would likely hurt more consumers 
than it would help, such a policy might conflict with efforts by other 
government sectors to help consumers purchase homes. These types 
of conflicting policies can lead to incoherent and inconsistent results, 
creating uncertainty for consumers.  
 The more independent an agency is the more likely it is that it will 
become isolated and will create policies with only its own goals in 
mind, not taking into consideration or understanding how the policies 
will affect other sectors or the financial system as a whole.102 This 
risk is further amplified by the CFPB being led by a single director, 
who has broad authority to engage in rulemaking. The CFPB Direc-
tor has no multimember commission to answer to, no higher authori-
ty to answer to in budgetary appropriations (in fact, the CFPB Direc-
tor himself sets the agency’s budget, subject to statutory limita-
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 98. Id. § 5513(c)(3). 
 99. See id.
 100. See infra Part IV (discussing how most other regulatory agencies are subject to con-
gressional appropriations authority and are led by multimember boards or commissions).  
 101. See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 44, at 363.  
 102. See id.
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tions),103 and any policy initiatives of the director and the agency as a 
whole are subject to oversight only by the FSOC, which can only de-
feat CFPB regulations with a supermajority vote of its voting mem-
bers.104 Moreover, the members of the FSOC cannot even vote against 
a CFPB regulation except in the extreme circumstance of a threat so 
severe that it “put[s] the [very] safety and soundness of the United 
States banking system or the stability of the [United States] financial 
system . . . at risk.”105   
 The CFPB’s extreme independence is touted as one of its greatest 
virtues, but history has shown that while independence from political 
pressure can be a virtue, near total isolation is not. The CFPB must 
be reformed in order to effectively carry out its mission of protecting 
consumers, or it may well ultimately inadvertently harm the very 
consumers it was designed to protect.     
III. DESPITE ITS BROAD POWER, THE CFPB CANNOT PREVENT 
ANOTHER CRISIS
The CFPB was put into place not just to protect consumers but 
also as a safeguard against a future crisis. According to the Senate 
report on the Dodd-Frank Act, “it was the failure by the prudential 
regulators to give sufficient consideration to consumer protection 
that helped bring the financial system down.”106 However, as dis-
cussed in the subsequent section, while a lack of sufficient consumer 
protection did contribute to the financial crisis, it was just one of a 
great many factors, and a fairly minor one at that. Thus, even assum-
ing that the CFPB can succeed where other regulators have failed 
and provide for the optimum level of consumer protection without 
cutting potential borrowers off from the credit markets unnecessari-
ly, the CFPB still would not be able to prevent another crisis. 
A.   Causes of the Financial Crisis  
 An in-depth analysis of what caused the financial crisis is outside 
the scope of this Note, but a general overview is needed in order to 
put into context the issue of consumer protection. A good place to 
start is the findings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
(hereinafter “FCIC”), which was created as a part of the Fraud En-
forcement and Recovery Act of 2009 to “examine the causes, domestic 
and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 103. See 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(1) (2012). 
 104. See id. § 5513(c)(3)(A). 
 105. See id. § 5513(c)(3)(B). 
 106. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 166 (2010). 
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States.”107 The FCIC was composed of a ten-member panel, six of 
which were appointed by the Democratic leadership of Congress and 
four by the Republican leadership.108 The majority’s report is over 
four hundred pages long,109 which is an indication of the complexity of 
the issue and the difficulty in determining what the root causes of 
the crisis were.    
 The FCIC found that “widespread failures in financial regulation 
and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s 
financial markets,” noting that while regulators had the power to 
protect the financial system, that power was not adequately exer-
cised.110 The government as a whole was not prepared for the crisis, 
and the various regulatory agencies did not respond in a consistent 
manner, which contributed to the crisis by creating uncertainty and 
panic.111 This finding underscores the importance of a coherent and 
consistent regulatory scheme and the need for the regulatory agencies 
to be interconnected with each other and the rest of the government. A 
powerful independent agency such as the CFPB is even more likely to 
cause confusion and panic than the other regulatory agencies because 
it has a narrow focus, broad power, and it is nearly completely inde-
pendent from the other agencies and the rest of the government.112     
 The FCIC next identified as a “key cause” of the crisis “dramatic 
failures of corporate governance and risk management at many sys-
temically important financial institutions.”113 Many of these institu-
tions either drastically misjudged the risk of mortgage-related securi-
ties built with subprime mortgages or were so focused on short-term 
gains that they ignored these risks.114 Normally we would expect  
institutions that take such big bets and lose to simply fail and be 
swallowed up, but because these institutions are so intrinsic to the 
financial system as a whole they were considered too big to fail.115 This 
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 107. About the Commission: History of the Commission, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N,
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310173617/http://www.fcic.gov/about (last 
visited May 10, 2013). 
 108. Id.
 109. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. & ECON. CRISIS IN THE 
U.S., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT vi  
(2011), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310173545/http:// 
c0182732.cdn1.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/fcic_final_report_full.pdf. 
 110. Id. at xviii. 
 111. See id. at xxi. 
 112. See Zywicki, supra note 19, at 872 (“[T]he institutional structure of the CFPB . . . 
[makes it] a virtual poster child for an agency design that eventually will be likely to mani-
fest the bureaucratic pathologies that led to the disastrous regulatory policies that were 
abandoned in the 1970s.”). 
 113. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. & ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S., supra note 
109, at xviii-xix. 
 114. See id.
 115. See id. at 37. 
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resulted in many of the financial institutions being “bailed out.”116 A 
related factor was executive compensation, which was often focused 
on short-term gain without proper regard for long-term consequenc-
es.117 The compensation systems greatly incentivized taking highly 
risky actions because of the potential for huge profits on the upside 
and limited downside.118 In fact, acting in a prudent, risk-adverse 
manner was highly discouraged by such compensation systems.  
 Another cause identified by the FCIC was a race to the bottom in 
mortgage-lending standards prompted by an ever-increasing demand 
for mortgage-backed securities.119 Many lenders “simply took eager 
borrowers’ qualifications on faith, often with a willful disregard for a 
borrower’s ability to pay.”120 These subprime mortgages often includ-
ed an “option ARM” and other terms that made the payments back-
loaded, so that the payments would start out at an affordable level 
but gradually rise, sometimes by large percentages.121 Some lenders 
and third parties went even further, engaging in predatory practices, 
with some of the more unscrupulous “openly stalking desperate fami-
lies looking for a financial lifeline.”122 When the housing bubble 
popped and housing prices fell, many borrowers found themselves 
owing significantly more than the property was worth.123 This was 
not limited to subprime borrowers; as the crisis deepened, even buy-
ers who were well-qualified at the time they bought their home and 
who had put down reasonable down payments found themselves 
underwater on their mortgage, resulting in some middle class and 
even “rich” borrowers strategically defaulting.124 Strategic defaults 
are themselves a contributory factor to the depth of the crisis; they 
did not cause the crisis, but they did widen its scope and slow the  
economic recovery.125
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 116. See id. at xxv. 
 117. Id. at xix. 
 118. Id.
 119. See id. at xxiii-xxiv (“We conclude collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the 
mortgage securitization pipeline lit and spread the flame of contagion and crisis.”).  
 120. Id.
 121. See id.
 122. Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mort-
gage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1360 (2010). 
 123. Id. at 1359-60. 
 124. See Curtis Bridgeman, The Morality of Jingle Mail: Moral Myths About Strategic 
Default, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 123-24 (2011) (“The decision to default even when 
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 125. See id. at 153 (“Those who engage in strategic default not only threaten the stabil-
ity of the banking system and slow down the economic recovery; they also fail to live up to 
their obligations to each of us, leaving us to pay for the money they borrowed, and for no 
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 The credit-rating agencies also share in the blame; in the years 
leading up to the crisis, Moody’s alone rated nearly 45,000 mortgage-
backed securities with its coveted triple A rating, without which they 
would not have been nearly as marketable.126 Eighty-three percent of 
these mortgage-backed securities were ultimately downgraded, but 
the damage was already done.127 This leads to the question of how 
they could have been so wrong, and a large part of the answer is that 
they had little incentive to get it right. The credit-rating agencies 
compete with each other for business, and because of the relatively 
limited field of potential clients, with the major financial institutions 
constituting the majority of their business, the credit-rating agencies 
have a strong incentive to give the institutions the ratings they 
want.128 The institutions and the credit-rating agencies knew that the 
marketability of the mortgage-backed securities depended on them 
receiving triple A ratings, and if a credit-rating agency did not give 
the securities the needed rating then the institution issuing them 
would likely have turned to one of the other agencies. 
 This list of causes is far from exhaustive but is sufficient to show 
that numerous factors contributed to the financial crisis, with the 
lack of sufficient consumer protection being but one small piece of the 
problem. But even if a lack of sufficient consumer protection was the 
root cause of the financial crisis, the CFPB still would likely fail in 
preventing a future crisis. The FCIC did not find that the failure of 
the regulators to adequately protect consumers and the financial sys-
tem as a whole stemmed from it lacking the power to act; rather, it 
found that the regulators failed to effectively use their power.129 Con-
sequently, the creation of a new highly independent regulator with 
broad authority is not the answer. As discussed further in the subse-
quent section, no amount of regulatory power invested in a wholly 
independent consumer protection agency can prevent a financial cri-
sis. It can reduce the effects of a financial crisis, but it could just as 
easily worsen the effects, or even trigger a financial crisis itself by 
overly restricting access to credit. 
 In order to avoid such a result, the CFPB must not be isolated 
from other parts of the government and free from any significant 
oversight. Effective regulation can greatly help to reduce the risk of a 
financial crisis, but only when the regulatory scheme as a whole is 
coherent. Without a multimember commission, budgetary oversight, 
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 127. See id.
 128. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 1 HARV.
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or any meaningful oversight on its policy making, the CFPB will like-
ly become overly isolated and make policies without duly considering 
interests outside of its own narrow focus. In order to successfully pro-
tect consumers and protect against another crisis, the CFPB must act 
as a part of a whole, not as a completely independent entity with 
broad power and a narrow focus.   
B.   The CFPB Cannot Prevent Another Crisis   
 The CFPB has broad authority over transactions with consumers, 
including the authority to take action against a covered person or 
service provider who engages in “unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] 
or practice[s] under Federal law in connection with any transaction 
with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the 
offering of a consumer financial product or service.”130 The CFPB also 
has the power to prescribe rules relating to any such conduct, includ-
ing requirements imposed for the purpose of preventing such acts or 
practices from occurring.131 The CFPB was granted this authority to 
further its purpose, which is to “ensure[ ] that all consumers have 
access to markets for consumer financial products and services and 
that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, 
transparent, and competitive.”132
 The CFPB’s broad authority over transactions with consumers 
cannot address many of the causes of the crisis, and inadequate con-
sumer protection was not a significant enough cause on its own for 
improvements in that area to prevent another crisis.133 The CFPB 
has a role to play in preventing a future crisis, but only if it acts in 
conjunction with the other regulatory agencies so that the overall 
regulatory scheme is coherent. The statute creating the CFPB pur-
ports to require that it coordinate with the other agencies, saying 
that “[t]he Bureau shall coordinate with the Commission, the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, 
and other Federal agencies and State regulators, as appropriate, to 
promote consistent regulatory treatment of consumer financial and 
investment products and services.”134 However, because of the lack  
of any meaningful oversight of the CFPB’s actions, this purported 
requirement has no force. 
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IV. HOW TO FIX THE CFPB
 The CFPB must undergo significant reform in order to avoid it 
acting with the same type of tunnel vision that led to the abolishment 
of the CAB and ICC.135 An agency should not act inside a vacuum; in 
fact, an agency should not be allowed to act with such a degree of in-
dependence that it could take actions in conflict with other govern-
ment actors without Congress or anyone else having any meaningful 
way to prevent the action. The risks associated with the level of inde-
pendence possessed by the CFPB far outweigh any corresponding 
benefits, and there is no legitimate reason why the CFPB should be 
structured so differently from the other regulatory agencies. 
 That is not to say that having an agency possess some level of in-
dependence is in no way beneficial. Some degree of political and fi-
nancial independence can be valuable for an agency like the CFPB 
because such independence insulates it from outside pressures, po-
tentially allowing it to take action when other sectors of the govern-
ment fail to do so. A balance must therefore be struck between hav-
ing enough autonomy to operate effectively and being subject to 
enough oversight to ensure that the overall regulatory scheme is con-
sistent and that decisions are not made in an overly narrow-minded 
fashion. The CFPB’s current structure gives it far too much inde-
pendence, making the risk of it creating narrow-minded policies, po-
tentially conflicting with the actions of other government sectors and 
thus making the overall regulatory scheme inconsistent and incoher-
ent, far greater than any potential benefits of such a high level of in-
dependence. With some prudent reforms, the CFPB can maintain a 
useful level of autonomy while being subject to enough oversight to 
negate the risks posed by its current structure.      
A.   The CFPB Should be Subject to Congressional Oversight 
As it is currently structured, the CFPB is virtually completely in-
sulated from congressional oversight, with the only notable exception 
being the Senate’s power to confirm the Director. However, this ex-
ception has not yet had much significance other than potentially de-
laying the appointment of the CFPB’s inaugural director and dis-
suading President Obama from nominating Elizabeth Warren, since 
the CFPB’s inaugural director has not actually been confirmed by the 
Senate.136 In any event, the CFPB is free from congressional appropri-
ations authority, or even appropriations authority from the Federal 
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 135. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text (discussing the history and ultimate 
abolishment of the CAB and ICC). 
 136. See supra Part I.A (discussing the appointment of CFPB Director Richard Cordray). 
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Reserve, and appropriations authority is one of the most effective 
means of congressional oversight.137
 Those against giving Congress appropriations authority argue 
that doing so would make the CFPB vulnerable to political influ-
ence.138 To the extent that Congress is made up of individual  
members, each of whom holds his or her own political beliefs, sub-
jecting the CFPB to congressional appropriations authority will 
subject the CFPB to some degree of political influence. But the 
same can be said for virtually every other expense of the govern-
ment, including the budgets of all the agencies that are subject to 
the congressional appropriations process, which includes two of the 
other federal financial regulators: the SEC139 and the Commodities 
Futures Exchange Commission.140
 By giving Congress appropriations authority over the CFPB, Con-
gress will at least have some mechanism of oversight over the CFPB, 
which could serve as a means of ensuring that the CFPB considers 
various different viewpoints and interests. And even if the balance 
between restricting autonomy and reducing the risks created by the 
CFPB’s high level of independence was found, in the case of congres-
sional appropriates authority, to weigh against granting that author-
ity, the CFPB's current structure should not be retained. A less in-
trusive alternative to giving Congress direct appropriations authority 
would be to instead make the CFPB subject to appropriations author-
ity from the Federal Reserve. Under this scenario, instead of the 
CFPB Director setting the agency’s budget himself,141 the seven-
member Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve142 would set the 
CFPB’s budget based on its needs and the needs of the CFPB. This 
would at least subject the CFPB to some oversight authority, and 
would make it less removed from the congressional appropriations 
process since the CFPB budget would then be a part of the Federal 
Reserve’s budget that could be changed by the Federal Reserve based 
on congressional input.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 137. See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congression-
al Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON.
765, 767-69 (1983). 
 138. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to 
Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881,  
951 (2012). 
 139. Id.
 140. Id.
 141. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(1) (2012) (“Each year . . . the Board of Governors shall transfer 
to the Bureau from the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System, the amount 
determined by the [CFPB] Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out the authorities 
of the Bureau under Federal consumer financial law . . . .”). 
 142. See About the Fed, supra note 90. 
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B.   The CFPB Should be Headed by a  
Multimember Commission 
The CFPB is unusual in that it is both an independent agency 
with rulemaking authority and it is led by a single director. This is 
made even more unusual by that single director being insulated from 
removal except for “cause,” meaning “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.”143 Most other regulatory agencies are headed 
by a multimember commission or Board,144 and agencies that are led 
by only a single director usually do not have any significant rulemak-
ing authority and are removable at the pleasure of the President  
or another delegated official.145 Combining near total independence 
with broad rulemaking authority and a single director that cannot 
be removed except for cause is a recipe for disaster; any possible 
benefits that could result from such a structure are far outweighed 
by the corresponding risks. 
 Notably, some scholars disagree with the above assertion and ar-
gue that the single director structure should be retained. Professor 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Executive Director of the Center for Law, 
Economics and Finance at George Washington University School of 
Law,146 laid out his arguments against changing the current leader-
ship structure of the CFPB in a recent article.147 The crux of Professor 
Wilmarth’s argument is that “the factors of efficiency, stability, deci-
siveness and accountability argue in favor of retaining CFPB’s single-
Director model of governance.”148 Modifying the agency to be led by a 
five-member commission would, according to Professor Wilmarth, 
“likely produce more delay and less consistency in CFPB’s decision-
making . . . [and] would expose CFPB to the risk of leadership dead-
lock whenever a commissioner left office.”149 The problem with that 
line of argument is that it applies to literally every agency headed by 
a multimember commission that has any decisionmaking authority. 
Indeed, Professor Wilmarth seems to advocate for doing away with 
multimember commissions altogether.150
 Having a single director as opposed to a multimember commission 
does, admittedly, streamline the decisionmaking process making it 
easier for the agency to operate, much like having a dictatorship 
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 143. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012). 
 144. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Zywicki, supra note 19, at 873-74. 
 146. Faculty Directory: Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., GEO. WASH. U. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=1732 (last visited May 10, 2013). 
 147. See Wilmarth, supra note 138, at 919-24. 
 148. Id. at 921. 
 149. Id.
 150. See id. at 922 (“[T]he lengthy vetting process for Presidential nominees and pro-
longed Senate confirmation battles have frequently resulted in persistent vacancies and 
policy deadlocks at agencies with multimember commissions.”). 
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would make the government much more efficient compared to our 
current government with its checks and balances. If a single individ-
ual controlled all aspects of the government, then policies could be 
created and implemented in much less time and that individual 
would be able to ensure that the government acts as a unified whole. 
An extreme analogy, but it illustrates the point that efficiency con-
cerns should not be the key factor in determining the optimum agen-
cy structure. The value of discourse should not be understated; hav-
ing a multimember commission of individuals with different ideologi-
cal views could drastically improve the decisionmaking process.151
 When a group of people with different ideological views must come 
to a decision, it forces the proponents of each course of action to ar-
ticulate reasoned arguments supporting their view, which allows 
both sides to see the strengths and weaknesses of their positions, 
thus allowing them to reach an informed decision.152 Of course, this 
may be a somewhat optimistic view. In some cases, views and posi-
tions are so divergent that no real middle ground can be found. But 
even in those instances, where the majority does not alter its position 
and takes action irrespective of strong objections by the minority, the 
existence of the minority still serves a valuable function as it can 
serve as a whistleblower to actions taken by the majority which have 
potentially serious ramifications.    
 Professor Wilmarth warns of a “threat of institutional paralysis” if 
the CFPB is headed by a multimember commission; a threat he ar-
gues will be heightened if any such commission is limited to only hav-
ing three of the five members affiliated with the same political par-
ty.153 However, other regulatory agencies have exactly that structure, 
including the FTC,154 the Commodities Futures Exchange Commis-
sion,155 and the SEC.156 These agencies have been creating policies and 
making decisions for decades without suffering from “institutional 
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 151. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) (“[N]umerous studies have found that group 
decisions are not only superior to those of the average member, but also to those made by 
the very best individual decisionmakers within the group.”). 
 152. See id. at 29 (“Although individuals may well be better at devising a brilliant plan, 
individuals often become wedded to their plans and fail to see flaws that others might identify.”). 
 153. See Wilmarth, supra note 138, at 921. 
 154. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) (stating that the FTC “shall be composed of five Commis-
sioners, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate” and that no “more than three of the Commissioners shall be members of the same  
political party”). 
 155. 7 U.S.C. 2(a)(2)(A) (2012) (“The Commission shall be composed of five Commis-
sioners who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. . . . Not more than three of the members of the Commission shall be members of 
the same political party.”). 
 156. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012) (stating that the SEC shall “be composed of five commis-
sioners to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate” and 
that no “more than three of such commissioners shall be members of the same political party”). 
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paralysis.” There is no reason to expect that the typical structure of a 
five-member commission with a maximum of three members being from 
the same political party would not work for the CFPB when it has for so 
many other agencies, and having a multimember commission ensures 
that meaningful discourse will take place in reaching decisions.  
  As Professor Wilmarth points out, the director of the CFPB is 
currently statutorily required to consult with others before making 
major policy decisions.157 While technically true, these requirements 
unfortunately ring hollow. Professor Wilmarth’s first example is that 
the director must seek advice from the CFPB’s Consumer Advisory 
Board.158 The Dodd-Frank Act specifies that “[t]he Director shall es-
tablish a Consumer Advisory Board to advise and consult with the 
[CFPB] in the exercise of its functions under the Federal consumer 
financial laws, and to provide information on emerging practices in 
the consumer financial products or services industry . . . .”159 Other 
than stating that appointments to the Board should be made “with-
out regard to party affiliation” and that at least six of the members 
(the total number of which is not specified) must be appointed based 
on the recommendation of the regional Federal Reserve Bank Presi-
dents, there is no constraint on the Director’s power of appoint-
ment.160 Nothing prevents the Director from simply filling the Board 
with individuals sharing the same ideological beliefs as himself, 
which would greatly limit how effectively it could meaningfully con-
tribute useful feedback on proposed policies. Moreover, even if the 
Director did not have sole discretion in appointing the Board mem-
bers, the Board would still have little effectiveness because the Direc-
tor is under no obligation to actually listen to anything the Board has 
to say. The Board is supposed to “advise and consult” with the CFPB, 
but it has no power whatsoever; the Director is free to simply disre-
gard everything that the Board members say.161
 Professor Wilmarth points to the small business advisory panel as 
another example of how the Director must consider outside inter-
ests.162 Unfortunately, the small business advisory panel is even more 
ineffective than the Consumer Advisory Board. The panel only plays 
any role at all when the proposed regulation would have an impact 
on the cost of credit for small businesses,163 and even then it plays 
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 157. See Wilmarth, supra note 138, at 923. 
158. See id.
 159. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 1014(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1974 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5495(a) (2012)). 
 160. Id. § 1014(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5494(b) (2012)). 
 161. See id. § 1014(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5494(a) (2012)). 
 162. See Wilmarth, supra note 138, at 923-24. 
 163. See Dodd-Frank § 1100G(b) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 609 (2012)). 
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only a minor advisory role.164 As with the Consumer Advisory Board, 
the panel has no authority whatsoever over the CFPB; the CFPB  
Director is free to form a panel filled with individuals sharing his 
ideological views, and free to completely ignore any input provided 
from the panel.165 Thus, neither the Consumer Advisory Board nor 
the small business advisory panel adequately compensate for the lack 
of a multimember commission.   
 Finally, Professor Wilmarth points to how the CFPB is required to 
consult with the other federal financial regulators before adopting 
major policies.166 The Dodd-Frank Act specifies that the CFPB “shall 
consult with the appropriate prudential regulators or other Federal 
agencies prior to proposing a rule and during the comment process 
regarding consistency with prudential, market, or systemic objectives 
administered by such agencies.”167 If the consulted regulator formally 
objects to the CFPB’s proposed rule and provides the CFPB with a 
written objection, then the CFPB must respond to that objection in 
its release of the rule and provide the basis for the CFPB’s decision.168
This is Professor Wilmarth’s most compelling point, because the CFPB 
does at least have to respond to the objection and provide some basis 
for its decision to proceed irrespective of the objection, but in the end 
the CFPB is still free to proceed as it pleases regardless of how many 
objections it receives and how compelling those objections are.  
 Thus, even taken in the aggregate, these requirements that the 
CFPB consult with other parties is no substitute for having the agen-
cy headed by a multimember commission. None of these other parties 
has any control over what policies the CFPB puts into place, and the 
Director is largely free to simply ignore any input received. By con-
trast, in a multimember commission, each member gets an equal 
vote, and each member’s concerns and advice must therefore be tak-
en seriously. Even if a majority of the commissioners share a similar 
ideology and agree on most points, a multimember commission is still 
far more effective than any of the consultation requirements Profes-
sor Wilmarth points to because it better protects against shortsighted 
or irrational policies. The members of the commission would be much 
more knowledgeable about the CFPB’s operations and about the 
goals and intentions behind any particular policy than any outside 
party, and they would thus be in a better position to raise concerns or 
objections to the proposed policy. Moreover, because each commis-
sioner would get a vote, the members with the minority viewpoint 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 164. See id. (When applicable, the CFPB shall “identify representatives of small enti-
ties in consultation with the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administra-
tion [and] collect advice and recommendations from the representatives . . . .”). 
 165. See id.
 166. See Wilmarth, supra note 138, at 923. 
 167. Dodd-Frank § 1022(b)(2)(B) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(B) (2012)). 
 168. See id. § 1022(b)(2)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(C) (2012)). 
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would only need to convince one of the three members with the ma-
jority viewpoint that a given action is unwise, or that a suggested 
change would be beneficial, in order for the proposed policy to be re-
jected or revised. By contrast, with a single director, he does not have 
to seriously consider any outside advice (or even advice from others 
inside the CFPB for that matter) before taking action.  
 What makes the one director structure especially dangerous in the 
context of the CFPB is that the director cannot even be removed from 
office by the President except for cause. If the single director struc-
ture is retained, the position should at least be modified to subject 
the director to removal at the discretion of the President. This is an 
imperfect solution as the CFPB director would still possess the same 
broad power that he does now and would still be able to act with little 
regard for concerns raised by other parties, but at least the President 
would have some mechanism to ensure that the actions taken by the 
director conform with the overall regulatory scheme and do not con-
flict with actions taken by other agencies. Presidential removal pow-
er would give the Executive Branch a means of constraining a direc-
tor who acts with too narrow of a focus or otherwise does not act in 
conformance with the best interests of society as a whole. However, 
because it would still leave too much power in a single director and 
would not be enough to ensure that meaningful discourse takes place 
in the decisionmaking process, reforming the CFPB to be headed by a 
multimember commission is a far better solution. 
C.   The CFPB Should be Subject to OIRA Review 
 Since its creation, the OIRA has been relied upon to ensure that 
the overall regulatory scheme is coherent and that the various agen-
cies coordinate with each other to produce sound policies.169 Over the 
course of the last thirty years, the general rule has been that all 
agencies must submit proposed regulations to the OIRA along with a 
cost-benefit analysis of the regulation.170 An exception applies to “in-
dependent agencies”; agencies that are listed as such in the Paper-
work Reduction Act do not have to submit their regulations to  
the OIRA for review.171 The CFPB is included in this list, along with 
other regulatory agencies such as the FCC and the SEC.172 Thus, the 
exclusion of the CFPB from OIRA review is not surprising or unusual, 
         
 169. See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 44, at 366 (discussing how the OIRA is the pri-
mary office tasked with solving the “chronic” issue of creating a coherent regulatory scheme).  
 170. See id. at 366 (“OIRA reviews all economically significant regulations proposed by 
executive branch agencies, and its central tasks have been supported by Presidents of both 
parties for the past thirty years.”); Barkow, supra note 45, at 31 (“Every president since 
Ronald Reagan has used OIRA to require agencies under OIRA’s jurisdiction to justify 
their proposed regulations using cost-benefit analysis.”). 
 171. See Barkow, supra note 45, at 32. 
 172. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012). 
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but as a matter of efficient policy it is puzzling why such an organiza-
tion would not be subject to OIRA review. Sally Katzen, who served 
as the Administrator of the OIRA during the Clinton Administration, 
highlighted how critical the OIRA’s role as overseer is: 
The agencies focus like a laser, as they should, on their statutory 
missions—in the case of EPA, protecting the environment. The 
White House and OIRA take a broader view and consider how, for 
example, an environmental proposal will affect energy resources, 
tax revenues, health policy, etc. Stated another way, EPA is pursu-
ing a parochial interest; OIRA is tempering that with the national 
interest, as it should.173
 As a policy matter, the reasoning behind subjecting an organiza-
tion like the EPA to OIRA review seems to apply at least as strongly 
to an organization like the CFPB. Perhaps the reason independent 
regulatory agencies have historically been exempt from OIRA review 
is that they are generally headed by a multimember commission, and 
this is considered enough of a substitute for OIRA review.174 If that is 
the case, then exempting the CFPB makes very little sense consider-
ing its current structure,175 but even if the CFPB is reformed to be 
headed by a multimember commission it should still be subject to 
OIRA review. The OIRA is in the best position to ensure that the 
regulatory scheme as a whole is coherent and consistent, but it can-
not fully fulfill its role when agencies such as the CFPB are exempt 
from having to submit their proposed regulations for OIRA review.  
D.   The FSOC Should Be Given Enhanced Veto Power over the      
CFPB’s Regulations 
 With the CFPB’s current structure, the FSOC is the only entity 
that can actually prevent a CFPB regulation from taking effect. It 
provides some oversight over the CFPB, but it is much too limited, 
because the standard for the FSOC to override a decision of the 
CFPB is so high that it is virtually insurmountable. Only a two-
thirds vote of the FSOC’s ten voting members, consisting of the heads 
of the nine federal financial regulatory agencies and one independent 
         
 173. Sally Katzen, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on “Inside the 
Administrative State,” 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497, 1505 (2007). 
 174. See Zywicki, supra note 19, at 892 (“It is not clear why independent agencies have 
been exempted from OIRA’s reach, . . . but one possible pragmatic or policy justification is 
that independent agencies have alternative mechanisms of ensuring quality control in the 
production of rules and other outputs, which Executive Branch departments often do not 
have. . . . For example, independent agencies typically are headed by a multi-member 
commission, often bipartisan in composition, and the information and debate produced in 
the resulting deliberative process may provide a partial substitute for OIRA review.”). 
 175. See supra discussion in Part IV.B (discussing how the CFPB currently has a single 
director instead of a multimember commission).  
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member appointed by the President,176 can override a decision of the 
CFPB.177 The CFPB Director, as a voting member of the FSOC,178
counts for one of the ten votes on whether or not the CFPB’s regula-
tion should be overridden. As a practical matter, it is extremely un-
likely that the CFPB Director will ever vote to override a regulation 
of the CFPB, which could not have been issued in the first place 
without his approval; thus, in order for the FSOC to override a CFPB 
regulation, seven of the remaining nine voting members—roughly 
seventy-eight percent—must vote to override the regulation. As if 
this weren’t daunting enough, a member of the FSOC can only vote 
to set aside a regulation of the CFPB if the agency or department 
that the member represents has “made an official determination, at a 
public meeting where applicable, that the regulation which is the 
subject of the petition would put the safety and soundness of the 
United States banking system or the stability of the financial system 
of the United States at risk.”179
 In order for the FSOC’s oversight of the CFPB to be meaningful, 
the standard for it to set aside a CFPB regulation must be reduced to 
a more reasonable level. If instead of a two-thirds vote of the voting 
members the standard was a simple majority of the voting mem-
bers—excluding the CFPB Director—then the FSOC would be in a 
much better position to ensure that the CFPB does not pass regula-
tions with harmful effects. This would still be a very high standard; 
five out of the nine remaining voting members—roughly fifty-six per-
cent—would have to vote to set aside the regulation, and each mem-
ber would still only be able to vote if their organization had deter-
mined the regulation “would put the safety and soundness of the 
United States banking system or the stability of the financial system 
of the United States at risk.”180 Thus, any concern that such a change 
would give the FSOC too much control over the CFPB is misplaced. 
This reform would simply give the FSOC the power to effectively per-
form its oversight function, which is to ensure that CFPB regulations 
do not threaten the United States banking or financial system.181
 It is worth noting that there is one other way for a regulation of 
the CFPB to be invalidated—the courts can intervene when an agen-
cy neglects its statutory obligations and have shown a willingness to 
do so in challenges involving other regulatory agencies.182 But while 
         
 176. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 111(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1985 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1) (2012)). 
 177. See id. § 1023(c)(3)(A) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 5513(c)(3)(A) (2012)). 
 178. Id. § 111(b)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1) (2012)). 
 179. Id. § 1023(c)(3)(B)(ii) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 5513(c)(3)(B)(ii) (2012)). 
 180. See id.
 181. See id.
 182. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (invalidating a 
rule of the SEC because, as summarized in the Reporter: (1) the agency “neglected its statutory 
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the courts can, and at times will, invalidate agency regulations that 
are arbitrary and contrary to the agency’s statutory obligation,183 this 
is far too limited and too uncertain of a check on the CFPB’s power. 
Part of the reason that it is an insufficient safeguard is that the 
Court must wait for a challenge to be brought before it can review an 
action of the CFPB; thus, it cannot review all actions of the CFPB, 
nor can it prevent them from taking effect prior to its review. But 
even more fundamentally, the courts are not a sufficient safeguard 
because their power to invalidate regulations is too limited. A court 
cannot invalidate regulations because they are bad policy or conflict 
with other regulations; the court needs a valid statutory or constitu-
tional reason for invalidating a regulation. Moreover, a court’s review 
does not help in the policy creation stage, because its review general-
ly is not conducted until the policy has already been implemented. A 
court cannot simply make suggestions on how to improve the policy; 
it must decide whether it is valid or not.  
V. CONCLUSION
 The CFPB currently suffers from the same structural deficiencies 
that led to the incoherent regulatory scheme that plagued the nation 
prior to the massive reforms put into place in the 1970s-80s.184 Dur-
ing that time period, agencies with similar structures to the CFPB 
were either abolished or drastically reformed, yet the CFPB is struc-
tured very similarly to those failed agencies, ignoring the lessons 
from the past. In order to avoid a repeat of the agency failures seen 
leading up to the reforms of the 1970s-80s, the CFPB must be re-
formed.185 While OIRA review largely solved the problem of conflict-
ing and incoherent policies, the CFPB (and other independent regu-
latory agencies) are currently not subject to it, making it an incom-
plete solution to the overall problem and no help at all in the context 
of the CFPB.186
        
obligation to assess economic consequences of [the] rule by not making tough choices about 
which of [the] competing estimates regarding proxy contests was most plausible or to haz-
ard a guess as to which was correct; (2) [the] SEC relied upon insufficient empirical data 
when it concluded that [the] rule would improve board performance and increase share-
holder value by facilitating [the] election of dissident shareholder nominees; (3) [the] SEC 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not conducting [a] serious evaluation of costs that 
could be imposed upon companies from use of [the] rule by shareholders representing spe-
cial interests, particularly union and government pension funds; (4) [the] SEC arbitrarily 
ignored [the] effect of [the] final rule upon [the] total number of election contests; and (5) 
[the SEC’s] discussion of [the] estimated frequency of nomination under [the] rule was 
internally inconsistent and therefore arbitrary”). 
 183. See, e.g., id.
 184. See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra Part II. 
 186. See supra Part II. 
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 Moreover, while a lack of consumer protection contributed to the fi-
nancial crisis, it was a relatively minor cause in comparison to others.187
The CFPB cannot prevent another crisis on its own; it needs to work 
in conjunction with the other government sectors, not operate in a 
vacuum in which the CFPB can do as it sees fit without regard to 
broader interests. In order to effectively perform its function, do its 
part in preventing another financial crisis, and avoid suffering from 
the same type of tunnel vision that made past regulatory agencies 
that were similarly structured fail, the CFPB must be reformed.  
 First, the CFPB should be made subject to some degree of con-
gressional oversight. Subjecting the CFPB to the congressional ap-
propriations process would be a prudent way to ensure that the 
CFPB does not act in a way that is detrimental to the broader inter-
ests of the country. Second, the CFPB should be reformed to be led by 
a multimember commission instead of a single director. A multi-
member commission is superior to having a single director for a 
number of reasons, not the least of which is the benefits of having 
discourse in decisionmaking.  
 Third, the CFPB should be made subject to review by the OIRA, 
as should other similar independent agencies. The OIRA serves a 
valuable function: it ensures that the overall regulatory scheme is 
coherent and that the various agencies coordinate with each other 
and other government sectors to produce sound policies. But the  
OIRA cannot adequately perform this function when agencies like 
the CFPB are exempt from its review. All agencies, the CFPB includ-
ed, should be subject to review by the OIRA—only then will the OIRA 
be able to effectively prevent conflicting and narrow-minded policies 
from being enacted and ensure that the overall regulatory scheme is 
consistent and coherent. Lastly, the CFPB should be subject to more 
meaningful review by the FSOC by reducing the vote needed to veto 
a CFPB action from two-thirds to one-half. The way the FSOC is 
structured, a two-thirds vote is a virtually insurmountable standard; 
by reducing the requirement to a simple majority the FSOC’s role as 
an overseer of the CFPB will actually be fulfilled. Taken in the ag-
gregate, these reforms will ensure that the CFPB adequately per-
forms its function, does not act in an overly narrow-minded fashion, 
and does not enact policies that are inconsistent with the overall reg-
ulatory scheme. The result will be a more effective agency that will 
not be doomed to fail because of structural defects, but instead should 
continue to fulfill its mission for generations to come. 
         
 187. See supra Part III. 
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